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IV. ON PRAXIS

THE LOSS OF IDEALISMBY WHOM? AND WHEN?
MONROE

H.

FREEDMAN*

A recurring theme at the SALT conference was the view that
students come to law school full of fervor to further social justice and
law reform, and leave with no other interest than to practice in prestigious law firms and become rich. The law school experience is thus
viewed as one that is destructive of idealism and that produces a profession of legal technicians devoid of a sense of social responsibility.
Although I agree that the legal profession as a whole has failed in
its responsibilities to society, I do not agree that the cause of that
failure is to be found in legal education. Certainly law school did not
have that effect on those of us who attended the conference to voice
our dismay over the state of our profession. Somehow we survived
the law school experience with social consciences intact; indeed, with
the benefit of our rigorous training in lawyering skills, we are now
able to deal more effectively with what we believe to be injustices in
society. Those of us at the conference, however, were only a small
portion of those in legal education, and a much smaller fraction of the
legal profession as a whole. What happened, then, to all those others
who entered law school with the sole goal in mind of righting social
wrongs?
The answer, it seems to me, is clear. Those people never
existed. Law school did not destroy their sense of social justice, because they never had it in the first place. That, at any rate, is the
conclusion I draw after a quarter of a century of involvement with law
students as a student, teacher, and administrator.
That conclusion should surprise no one. We admit people into
law school principally on the basis of their technical skill in attaining
high test scores, either by repeating back what they have been told,
or by marking the appropriate box in a short-answer machine-graded
examination. We give virtually no weight in the law school admissions
process to a candidate's manifest concern with social problems. The
end product of a legal education, therefore, is not conditioned in the
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University. A.B., 1951, LL.B., 1954, LL.M., 1956, Harvard
University. The author has been Chairman of the Committee on Admissions at HolJstra Law
School since 1973.
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classroom, but is predetermined before students enter class, in the
admissions process.
A rather forceful illustration of the attitude that affects law
school admissions-and that significantly determines, thereby, the
character of the legal profession-was provided about four years ago
at a meeting of the Northeast Association of Pre-Law Advisers. Those
attending the conference represented some of the most important
undergraduate sources of candidates for law school. Moreover, the
prelaw advisers play a significant part in advising and guiding candidates to-and away from-careers in the law. The principal speaker
at the NAPLA conference was Soia Mentschikoff, a law school dean
and the then President of the Association of American Law Schools.
Dean Mentschikoff's message to the pre-law advisers was presented
loudly and clearly. "Whatever you do," she counselled the counselors, "don't send me those mushy-headed kids who think they're
going to go to law school and change the world."
Although numerous law schools were represented at the conference, I was probably the one who did not share Dean MentschikotFs
attitude. Certainly, I was the only one who was moved to express
disagreement. I urged the pre-law advisers to send their "mushyheaded kids" to Hofstra Law School, and to have the candidates submit documentation of their asserted interest in social problems,
suggesting, for example, references from people who had supervised
them in community service work during their college years.
Unquestionably, law school and practice require intellectual facility. For that reason Hofstra has relied heavily upon a candidate's
academic achievement in college, although our primary focus has
been on the transcript rather than the cumulative grade point average. We have minimized, however, the weight given to Law School
Admission Test scores. Most important, we have paid substantial attention to the candidate's demonstrated concern with social problems,
as manifested in work and extracurricular activities.'
Since the point somehow seems to be readily misunderstood, let
me reiterate it in other words. I do not mean that law schools should
be admitting students who are "unqualified" in the sense of being
incapable of performing at a satisfactory academic level. For some
time, every accredited law school has had substantially more qualified
applicants than the school has been able to accommodate. Selection
within the qualified pool has always been characterized by a signifi1 As a result, the student body at Hofstra has been more experienced. more involved, and
more challenging than at law schools generally-a factor that is of independent significance to
legal education.
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cant degree of arbitrariness, by both design and necessity. My proposal, therefore, is simply that, in making selections from the pool of
qualified candidates, we give substantial weight to the demonstrated
likelihood that a candidate, as a member of the profession, will be
concerned with law as an instrument of social reform. Admittedly, the
prediction is an uncertain one-about as risky, in fact, as predicting
whether a candidate will make law review, become a federal judge,
become a partner in a Wall Street firm, or serve on the faculty of a
prestigious law school. The issue has never been whether we should
take risks in admissions, but what kinds of risks are worth taking and
what kinds of risks we are willing to take.
When I made that proposal at the SALT conference, a familiar
objection was expressed from the floor:
I am a little bit skeptical. I am afraid that if it worked out that the
top law schools give credit for those who demonstrate social concern, you would have people trying to build up a record of social
concern.
My response was, "Worse things could happen."
In fact, under generally current admissions policies and practices, worse things do happen. Aware that their grade point averages
will be a principal factor in admissions to law school, prelaw students
have been known to avoid taking challenging courses that are likey to
result in lower grades and to seek out "gut" or "cake" courses that
will maximize their GPAs. Thus we read in Scott Turow's One L
about Harvard Law School students, by a proportion of six-to-one,
electing to study Constitutional Law with a young and relatively inexperienced law professor rather than with Archibald Cox, primarily
because of Cox's reputation as a "notoriously low grader." 2 That disposition to place grades over the quality of the learning experience is
yet another characteristic that law students acquire long before coming to law school, and that we reward in our admissions policies and
practices.
Just as an apparently outstanding academic record can be established by concentrating on easy courses and by ingratiating oneself
with professors, an apparent concern with social justice can be manufactured. In my experience, however, a candidate's asserted commitment to community service is not easy to fake and is subject to
verification. For example, one candidate, Mr. J, appeared on the
basis of his academic credentials alone to be just another one of the
2

S. TuRow, ONE L 203-05 (1977). Having taken a course and a seminar from Professor

Cox, I can attest that he is a superior classroom teacher, particularly at a school where classroom teaching ability has never been a primary criterion for the faculty.
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mass of qualified candidates who necessarily would have to be rejected. Mr. J impressed me, however, with the fact that he had been
an enthusiastic participant in a special course in Community Involvement. I therefore wrote to Professor D, with whom Mr. J had
worked closely in the course. Professor D responded in part:
While taking my Community Involvement [Mr. J] never impressed me as a person intensely involved wvith human welfare.
...He was also somewhat frivolous.... I also felt that [Mr. I's)
talents were those of an entrepreneur. He is a young man who,
given free time, will not read about or visit a social welfare agency,
but rather develop an ingenious scheme of boosting his income.
Thus, my prediction is that if he graduates from law school,
there is a greater probability that he would join the family firm as a
corporate lawyer than pursue ...

an area of legal reform.

Consider, by contrast, the subsequent recommendation from the
same professor for another candidate:
Because I wanted to preserve your trust, I have refrained
from recommending to you any student who .as something less
than outstanding. But now, I believe, I have such a one.
...

[Mr. G's] sense of balance, perspective and fairness, [is]

admirable. He is the stuff that just and courageous leaders are
made of, something widely recognized by his classmates and colleagues.
One of [Mr. G's] most admirable gifts is the intimacy with
which he interrelates formal knowledge and social commitment.
For him, a college education is not a way of attaining a "union
ticket"-a diploma-but rather an indispensable training for responsible social welfare, which in his case lies in the area of justice.
Few law schools will even consider an applicant with an LSAT
score of 454. We accepted one such candidate who had been extensively involved in prison reform activities. Ramsey Clark wrote about
her:
[Ms. K] possesses that quality the legal profession needs most:
an ardent and unselfish desire to compassionately address human
need through democratic institutions, the processing of principle,
the rule of law. She is, as well, wise, sensitive, articulate and driven: an extraordinary person. I have watched [Ms. K] work for
nearly five years now in the most discouraging area of human
activity-prisons, parole, criminal justice. She has served under
the most frustrating and tenuous conditions.... Far from despairing, she has never faltered in her cheerful, faithful and very effective effort at reform.
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In addition, Professor Herman Schwartz wrote in part:
Because of this combination of skill, energy and initiative I
would strongly recommend that [Ms. K] be admitted to your law
school. I think her work ... shows motivation, judgment, inaturity, social commitment and leadership ability far above the average.
I could multiply such cases many times over-candidates whose
statistical credentials suggest that they will fall substantially short of
law review, but who possess, in Ramsey Clark's phrase, "that quality
the legal profession needs most: an ardent and unselfish desire to
compassionately address human need through democratic institutions,
the processing of principle, the rule of law." I should add that even at
Hofstra, such candidates are still a relatively small minority of those
college graduates who self-select themselves for law school (under the
guidance of prelaw advisers who have been conditioned by law
school admissions policies like those articulated by Dean
Mentschikoff). For better or worse, therefore, Hofstra gets its full
share of candidates whose academic records and aspirations are directed toward law review and a lucrative commercial practice.
Will people like Ms. K lose their sense of commitment to social
reform during the three years of law school? I think not. Moreover,
whatever the risk, I think it is worth taking. Two statistics may be bf
interest in that regard. First, the proportion of Hofstra Law School
graduates who have entered public service is 150% larger than law
school graduates generally. Second, the proportion of Hofstra
graduates who have taken jobs with public interest firms and indigent
services is more than 200% greater than law school graduates generally. I conclude, therefore, that if idealism is being lost, it is not
being lost by students in law school, but by administrators in the
admissions process.
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